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OPINION OF THE COURT 
               
 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case arises under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (1990). 
Appellants Susan and David N. brought the case individually, and 
as parents and natural guardians of their daughter, M., against 
the Wilson School District, charging that it had not fulfilled 
its statutory obligations to M. under the IDEA.  The hearing 
officer at the local educational level found in appellants' 
favor, concluding that M. was both mentally gifted and afflicted 
with a specific learning disability, and that she thereby was 
entitled to special education.  An appeals panel at the state 
education agency level reversed the hearing officer's findings. 
The appellants challenged this decision in a civil action in the 
district court, which affirmed the decision of the appeals panel 
on the record of the administrative proceedings without accepting 
the appellants' proffer of additional evidence.  The appellants 
appeal from the district court's order entered September 27, 
1994, in accordance with its opinion. 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 The appellants reside in the Wilson School District 
with M., who is now nine years old.  They believe that M. suffers 
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from attention deficit disorder with hyperactivity ("ADHD"), a 
learning disability manifested in attention problems, hyperactive 
motor behavior, poor social skills, extensive difficulty in 
completing tasks, low frustration tolerance, and low self-esteem. 
Memorandum and Order of the District Court ("Mem."), N. v. Wilson 
Sch. Dist., No. 93-4658, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 1994). 
M. has been treated with Ritalin, a medication intended to 
control the symptoms of ADHD.  See Mem. at 3 n.6.  The appellants 
believe that M.'s disability may affect her progress in school 
and that she is entitled to special education from the State of 
Pennsylvania.  Id. at 2. 
 During the spring of 1992, when M. was in kindergarten, 
the appellants requested that the school district undertake a 
multidisciplinary evaluation of her to determine whether she was 
in need of special education.1  Id.  In accordance with the 
appellants' request, a district multidisciplinary team ("MDT") 
conducted an evaluation in April 1992 that included two 
psychological examinations, an interview with M.'s kindergarten 
teacher, and discussions with appellants.  Id. at 2-3.  The MDT 
issued a report on June 2, 1992, concluding that M. was not 
"exceptional,"2 and that she did not require special education. 
                     
1
 Under the IDEA, "special education" is defined as "specially 
designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet 
the unique needs of a child with a disability, including -- (A) 
instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals 
and institutions, and in other settings; and (B) instruction in 
physical education."  20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16). 
2Pennsylvania defines the term "exceptional children" as 
"children of school age who deviate from the average in physical, 
mental, emotional or social characteristics to such an extent 
that they require special educational facilities or services  
4 
Specifically, the MDT found that M. did exhibit symptoms 
consistent with ADHD, including processing weaknesses that 
involved fine motor control, but that she had strong verbal 
skills and her ability and achievement levels were average or 
above average.  The MDT concluded that M. could be educated in a 
regular classroom as long as her school program addressed "`her 
strong verbal skills, her weak motor skills, and her difficulty 
with impulsivity and inattention and hyperactivity (which often 
lead to disorganization).'"  Id. at 3 (quoting Record at 321a). 
 On June 9, 1992, an Individual Education Program 
("IEP") team met with the appellants to discuss the MDT report.3 
Mem. at 4.  The IEP team agreed with the MDT's evaluation that M. 
was not exceptional and not in need of special education.  The 
team concluded that, in spite of her weaknesses, M. could sustain 
                                                                  
. . . ."  Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 13-1371(1) (1992). 
 
    The IDEA defines "children with disabilities" as children 
"(i) with mental retardation, hearing impairments including 
deafness, speech or language impairments, visual impairments 
including blindness, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic 
impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health 
impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by 
reason thereof, need special education and related services."  20 
U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1)(A). 
 
    In Pennsylvania, the term "exceptional" is used to refer both 
to students who are mentally gifted and in need of special 
education and students who have one of the 11 disabilities 
recognized under the IDEA and who, as a result thereof, require 
special education.  See 22 Pa. Code §§ 14.1 (definitions of 
"exceptional student" and "eligible student"); 342.1(b) 
definition of "mentally gifted") (1994).  The IDEA does not 
include the concept of "mentally gifted" within its definition of 
"children with disabilities."  See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1)(A). 
3
 Under Pennsylvania law, an IEP team must make the final 
determination of whether a student is eligible for special 
education.  See 22 Pa. Code §§ 14.32, 342.32 (1994). 
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herself in a regular academic curriculum with proper assistance 
from her parents and teachers.  Id.  The team then developed a 
Notice of Recommended Assignment ("NORA"), which consisted of 
written program "suggestions" to M.'s regular education teachers. 
Id. 
 The appellants refused to approve the school district's 
NORA, which was offered to them on June 18, 1992.  Mem. at 5. 
Instead, they requested a pre-hearing conference and an 
independent evaluation of M. at the school district's expense. On 
July 26, 1992, the appellants requested an administrative due 
process hearing pursuant to the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E).4 
Id. 
 A Pennsylvania Special Education Hearing Officer 
conducted the due process hearing on September 17 and September 
28, 1992.  The appellants presented two issues: (1) whether, 
under Pennsylvania law, M. is a mentally gifted child suffering 
from a _!___E_@Error! Reference source not found.`ÆÐÐ20 U.S.C. ÀÀ 
1401(a)15.  States wishing to receive funding underthe IDEA must 
ensure that "all children residing in the State whoare disabled, 
regardless of the severity of their disability, andwho are in 
need of special education and related services areidentified, 
located, and evaluated" by the state.  20 U.S.C. ÀÀÀÀ1412(2)(C), 
1414(a)(1)(A); ÃÃsee alsoÄÄ 34 C.F.R. ÀÀÀÀ 300.128(a)(1) &note 1, 
                     
4
 The district court seems to have mistakenly treated the school 
district's list of recommendations (NORA) for M. as an Individual 
Education Program (IEP).  See Mem. at passim.  The parties have 
stipulated that the district court was in error. See Joint 
Stipulation, app. at 126.  We describe an IEP, which is far more 
comprehensive than a NORA, later in this opinion. 
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300.220 & note, 300.300 note 3.  This obligation is knownas the 
"child find" duty.  ÃÃMatulaÄÄ, slip op. at 
10.ÔØ'0* ( (°°ÔŒÁ``ÁThe primary mechanism for delivering a free 
appropriateeducation is the development of a detailed instruction 
plan,known as an Individual Education Program ("IEP"), for each 
childclassified as disabled.  20 U.S.C. ÀÀ 1401(18).  An IEP 
consistsof, ÃÃinter aliaÄÄ, a specific statement of a student's 
presentabilities, goals for improvement, services designed to 
meet thosegoals, and a timetable for reaching the goals via the 
services. ÃÃId.ÄÄ ÀÀ 1401(a)(20).  The creation of an 
administrative structurecapable of producing IEPs is a requisite 
to receiving IDEA funds. ÃÃId.ÄÄ ÀÀ 1414(a)(5).  To the extent 
possible, however, a school must"mainstream" disabled students ©© 
that is, instruct them in aregular, not special, education 
setting.  ÃÃId.ÄÄ ÀÀ 1412(5).Á``ÁThe IDEA authorizes federal 
reviews of state and localcompliance, ÃÃseeÄÄ 34 C.F.R. ÀÀÀÀ 
104.61, 100.7, and affords certainprocedural safeguards to the 
parents of disabled children.  ÃÃInteraliaÄÄ, parents may examine 
all relevant records concerningevaluation and placement of their 
children, 20 U.S.C. ÀÀ1415(b)(1)(A); must receive prior written 
notice when a schoolproposes or refuses to alter a placement, ÀÀ 
1415(b)(1)(C); maycontest in an impartial due process hearing 
decisions regardingthe evaluation of their child or the 
appropriateness of thechild's program, ÀÀÀÀ 1415(b)(1)(E), 
1415(b)(2); may appeal thedecision from such a hearing to the 
state education agency, ÀÀ1415(c); and may obtain judicial review 
of the administrativedecision, ÀÀ 1415(e)(2).  ÃÃSeeÄÄ 
7 
ÃÃMatulaÄÄ, slip op. at 11;ÃÃBernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. 
J.H.ÄÄ, 42 F.3d 149, 158 & n.13 (3dÔ'0* ( (°°ÔCir. 1994); 
ÃÃLester H. v. GilhoolÄÄ, 916 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir.1990), 
ÃÃcert. deniedÄÄ, 499 U.S. 923, 111 S.Ct. 1317 (1991).  
Pennsylvania fulfills its IDEA obligations through a 
complexstatutory and regulatory scheme codified at Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit.24, ÀÀÀÀ 13©1371 and 13©1372 (1992), and 22 Pa. Code ÀÀÀÀ 
14.1 to14.74, 342.1 to 342.74 (1994).ÁàôìÁB.  JUDICIAL REVIEW 
UNDER THE IDEAƒÁ``ÁAs we noted above, the appellants brought this 
actionagainst the school district after requesting an 
administrativedue process hearing before a Pennsylvania Special 
EducationHearing Officer to satisfy a requirement of the IDEA, 20 
U.S.C.ÀÀÀÀ 1415(b)(1)(E), 1415(b)(2).  Mem. at 5.  After the 
hearingofficer decided in appellants' favor, the school 
districtappealed his decision to the Pennsylvania Special 
EducationAppeals Panel, which ruled in its favor.  ÃÃId.ÄÄ at 7.  
Accordingly,the appellants exhausted the IDEA's provisions for 
administrativereview, ÃÃseeÄÄ section 1415(c), and thus were 
entitled to bring thiscivil action.  ÃÃSeeÄÄ section 1415(e)(2).  
It is the nature of thatjudicial proceeding, in particular the 
extent to which the courtis required to receive evidence beyond 
that contained in theadministrative record, that the parties now 
principally dispute.Á``ÁWe approach this question by first 
addressing thejudicial review provision of the IDEA, section 
1415(e)(2), whichprovides in relevant part:ÐÐÐÐÂ°``ÂAny party 
aggrieved by the findings anddecision made under subsection . . . 
shallhave the right to bring a civil action withrespect to the 
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complaint presented pursuant toÔØ'0* ( (°°Ôthis section, which 
action may be brought inany State court of competent jurisdiction 
orin a district court of the United Stateswithout regard to the 
amount in controversy. In any action brought under this paragraph 
thecourt shall receive the records of theadministrative 
proceedings, shall hearadditional evidence at the request of a 
party,and, basing its decision on the preponderanceof the 
evidence, shall grant such relief asthe court determines is 
appropriate.ÐÐÆx`ÆÐÐ20 U.S.C. ÀÀ 1415(e)(2).Áhh#ÁIn determining 
the scope of a districtcourt's review under the IDEA, the Supreme 
Court has stated thatthe statute's language instructing that the 
district court,"basing its decision on the preponderance of the 
evidence, shallgrant such relief as the court determines is 
appropriate," doesnot mean that courts are free to substitute 
their own notions ofsound education policy for those of the 
educational agencies theyreview, but rather that they should give 
"due weight" to theadministrative proceedings.  ÃÃBoard of Educ. 
v. RowleyÄÄ, 458 U.S.at 205©06, 102 S.Ct. at 3050©51; ÃÃsee 
alsoÄÄ ÃÃFuhrmann v. EastHanover Bd. of Educ.ÄÄ, 993 F.2d 1031, 
1034 (3d Cir. 1993). Naturally, the requirement that the courts 
give "due weight" toadministrative proceedings has obliged the 
district courts todetermine how much weight is "due."  ÃÃSeeÄÄ 
ÃÃCapistrano Unified Sch.Dist. v. WartenbergÄÄ, 59 F.3d 884, 891 
(9th Cir. 1995).Á``ÁThe Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
has observedthat "judicial review in IDEA cases differs 
substantially fromjudicial review of other agency actions, in 
which courtsgenerally are confined to the administrative record 
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and are heldto a highly deferential standard of review."  ÃÃOjai 
Unified Sch.Ô'0* ( (°°ÔDist. v. JacksonÄÄ, 4 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th 
Cir. 1993), ÃÃcert.deniedÄÄ, 115 S.Ct. 90 (1994).  Because the 
IDEA specificallyrequires a district court to "receive the 
records of theadministrative proceedings, . . . hear additional 
evidence at therequest of a party, and, basing its decision on 
the preponderanceof the evidence," grant any appropriate relief, 
20 U.S.C. ÀÀ1415(e)(2), a district court "does not use the 
substantialevidence standard typically applied in the review 
ofadministrative agency decisions, `but instead must 
decideindependently whether the requirements of the IDEA are 
met.'" ÃÃMurray v. Montrose County Sch. Dist.ÄÄ, 51 F.3d 921, 927 
(10th Cir.1995) (quoting ÃÃBoard of Educ. v. Illinois State 
Bd.ÄÄ, 41 F.3d1162, 1167 (7th Cir. 1994)).Á``ÁThe courts of 
appeals differ in their description ofthe interplay between the 
Supreme Court's "due weight"interpretation and the IDEA's 
provision for independent judicialreview.  As the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recentlysummarized,ÐÐÐÐÂ°``Â[t]he 
district court must . . . independentlyreview the evidence 
contained in theadministrative record, accept and 
reviewadditional evidence, if necessary, and make adecision based 
on the preponderance of theevidence, while giving 'due weight' to 
theadministrative proceedings below.  This hasbeen described as a 
'modified ÃÃde novoÄÄ review,'or as 'involved 
oversight.'ÐÐÆx`ÆÐÐÃÃMurrayÄÄ, 51 F.3d at 927 (citations 
omitted).  The Court of Appealsfor the First Circuit has 
described judicial review under theIDEA as follows:  "Congress 
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intended courts to make bounded,Ô'0* ( (°°Ôindependent decisions 
©© bounded by the administrative record andadditional evidence, 
and independent by virtue of being based ona preponderance of the 
evidence before the court[.]"  ÃÃTown ofBurlington v. Department 
of Educ.ÄÄ, 736 F.2d 773, 791 (lst Cir.1984), ÃÃaff'd on other 
groundsÄÄ, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996(1985).Á``ÁWe have not 
spoken definitively on what constitutes"due weight" under the 
ÃÃRowleyÄÄ standard, and need not do so today. We, however, have 
referred to the interpretation of the standardfirst developed by 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit:ÐÐÐÐÂ°``Â[T]he 
question of the weight due theadministrative findings of facts 
must be leftto the discretion of the trial court.  Thetraditional 
test of findings being binding onthe court if supported by 
substantialevidence, or even a preponderance of theevidence, does 
not apply.  This does not mean,however, that the findings can be 
ignored. The court, in recognition of the expertise ofthe 
administrative agency, must consider thefindings carefully and 
endeavor to respond tothe hearing officer's resolution of 
eachmaterial issue.  After such consideration, thecourt is free 
to accept or reject the findingsin part or in 
whole.ÐÐÆx`ÆÐÐÃÃBurlingtonÄÄ, 736 F.2d at 791©92; ÃÃseeÄÄ 
ÃÃCarlisle Area Sch. v. ScottP.ÄÄ, 62 F.3d 520, 527 (3d Cir. 
1995) ("[D]istrict courts havediscretion to determine how much 
deference to accord theadministrative proceedings[.]"); 
ÃÃBernardsvilleÄÄ, 42 F.3d at 161(quoting ÃÃBurlingtonÄÄ); 
ÃÃOberti v. Board of Educ.ÄÄ, 995 F.2d 1204,1219 (3d Cir. 1993) 
("[T]he amount of deference to be affordedthe administrative 
11 
proceedings `is an issue left to thediscretion of the district 
court.'") (quoting ÃÃJefferson CountyÔ'0* ( (°°ÔBd. of Educ. v. 
BreenÄÄ, 853 F.2d 853, 857 (11th Cir. 1988));ÃÃFuhrmannÄÄ, 993 
F.2d at 1042 (Hutchinson, J., concurring anddissenting).Á``ÁThe 
district court relied on ÃÃRowleyÄÄ for itsdetermination that 
"[w]hile the court may, at its discretion,hear additional 
evidence, it must give `due weight' to theadministrative 
proceedings and the education experience andexpertise applied 
therein."  Mem. at 11.  The district courtthereafter concluded 
that "the proper exercise of discretionmove[d] it to decline to 
second©guess the judgment of theadministrative panel with 
evidence that was not before the panelwhen it made its decision," 
Mem. at 12.  Accordingly, thedistrict court ruled on the merits 
of the appellants' casewithout evaluating or accepting their 
proffer of additionalevidence.  ÃÃId.ÄÄ  The district court thus 
seems to have interpretedÃÃRowleyÄÄ to limit severely the IDEA's 
directive in section1415(e)(2) that, on judicial review, a court 
"shall hearadditional evidence at the request of a party."   
Á``ÁOur review of a district court's legal analysis isplenary.  
However, our review here "must be conducted within thegeneral 
framework of deference to state decision©makers" that isdictated 
by the IDEA and by the Supreme Court's direction inÃÃRowleyÄÄ.  
ÃÃFuhrmannÄÄ, 993 F.2d at 1032 (citing ÃÃWexler v. WestfieldBd. 
of Educ.ÄÄ, 784 F.2d 176, 181 (3d Cir.), ÃÃcert. deniedÄÄ, 479 
U.S.825, 107 S.Ct. 99 (1986)); ÃÃsee alsoÄÄ ÃÃCarlisleÄÄ, 62 F.3d 
at 526("We, of course, exercise plenary review over the 
districtÔ'0* ( (°°Ôcourt's conclusions of law and review its 
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findings of fact forclear error.").  In view of a district 
court's scope of reviewunder section 1415(e)(2) which goes beyond 
the traditionaldeferential standard, and in view of the provision 
in thatsection for the court to hear additional evidence at the 
requestof a party, we hold that the district court erred in 
concludingthat it is within a court's discretion summarily to 
excludealtogether the consideration of additional evidence 
submitted bya party.  Consequently, we are obliged to vacate its 
order andremand the matter for further proceedings.  We turn, 
then, to aconsideration of what additional evidence may be 
introduced onthe remand.ÁàˆìÁC.  ADDITIONAL EVIDENCEƒÁ``ÁThe 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, inÃÃBurlingtonÄÄ, 736 
F.2d 773, seems to have been the first court ofappeals to analyze 
the IDEA's directive that a district court"shall hear additional 
evidence at the request of a party."  ÃÃId.ÄÄat 790.  There, the 
court held that the word "additional" shouldbe construed in the 
ordinary sense of the word to mean"supplemental."  ÃÃId.ÄÄ  Thus 
construed, the act:ÐÐÐÐÂ°``Â[C]ontemplates that the source of the 
evidencegenerally will be the administrative hearingrecord, with 
some supplementation at trial. The reasons for supplementation 
will vary;they might include gaps in the administrativetranscript 
owing to mechanical failure,unavailability of a witness, an 
improperexclusion of evidence by the administrativeagency, and 
evidence concerning relevantevents occurring subsequent to 
theadministrative hearing.  The starting pointfor determining 
what additional evidenceÔØ'0* ( (°°Ôshould be received, however, 
is the record ofthe administrative proceeding.ÐÐÆx`ÆÐÐÃÃId.ÄÄ  In 
13 
providing examples of types of additional evidence thatmight be 
relevant to judicial review under the IDEA, theÃÃBurlingtonÄÄ 
court did not limit admissible evidence to those typesenumerated, 
which interpretation the school district would haveus make.  
ÃÃSeeÄÄ appellee's br. at 12©13.  In contrast, the courtseems 
merely to have provided examples of additional evidencethat a 
court could find relevant to IDEA matters on judicialreview.  
Á``ÁAlthough we never explicitly have interpreted thephrase, we 
recently referred to the ÃÃBurlingtonÄÄ construction 
of"additional evidence" in ÃÃBernardsvilleÄÄ, 42 F.3d at 161, 
where weupheld a district court's decision to exclude evidence 
ascumulative and an improper embellishment of testimony 
previouslygiven at an administrative hearing.  ÃÃSee alsoÄÄ 
ÃÃObertiÄÄ, 995 F.2d at1220 (court makes fact findings in IDEA 
case not only onadministrative record, but also on any new 
evidence presented byparties); ÃÃWexler v. Westfield Bd. of 
Educ.ÄÄ, 784 F.2d at 181(court must independently review the 
record, hear any requestedadditional evidence, and apply the 
preponderance standard). Other courts of appeals have followed 
ÃÃBurlingtonÄÄ's lead inconstruing section 1415(e)(2)'s 
"additional evidence" clause,ÃÃsee, e.g.ÄÄ, ÃÃOjaiÄÄ, 4 F.3d at 
1473 (upholding district court'sadmission of additional evidence 
concerning relevant eventsoccurring subsequent to the 
administrative hearing), although theinterpretation is not 
unanimous.  ÃÃSeeÄÄ ÃÃMetropolitan Gov't ofÔØ'0* ( (°°ÔNashville 
v. CookÄÄ, 915 F.2d 232, 234 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Insofar as[the 
language in ÃÃBurlingtonÄÄ] suggests that additional evidence 
14 
isadmissible only in limited circumstances, such as to 
supplementor fill in the gaps in the evidence previously 
introduced, wedecline to adopt the position taken by the First 
Circuit."); ÃÃseealsoÄÄ ÃÃMurrayÄÄ, 51 F.3d at 930©31 & n.15.  
Á``ÁAlthough we make no explicit interpretation of 
section1415(e)(2)'s "additional evidence" clause, even 
underÃÃBurlingtonÄÄ's restrictive approach a district court first 
mustevaluate a party's proffered evidence before deciding to 
excludeit.  Moreover, while the purpose of the ÃÃBurlingtonÄÄ 
constructionis to "structurally assist[ ] in giving due weight to 
theadministrative proceeding, as ÃÃRowleyÄÄ requires," 
ÃÃBurlingtonÄÄ, 736F.2d at 790, the court of appeals did not say 
that a districtcourt arbitrarily or summarily could exclude 
additional evidencesubmitted by a party in pursuit of that 
deference.  On thecontrary, the examples that ÃÃBurlingtonÄÄ 
provided of additionalevidence that should ÃÃnotÄÄ be admitted 
were all types of evidencethat courts might decide to exclude in 
a conventional civilproceeding.  For instance, the court stated 
that the additionalevidence clause "does not authorize witnesses 
at trial to repeator embellish their prior administrative hearing 
testimony; thiswould be entirely inconsistent with the usual 
meaning of`additional.'"  ÃÃId.ÄÄ  Even while making this 
statement, though,the court stressed that it would not be wise to 
devise a hardªand©fast rule:Ô'0* ( (°°ÔŒÐÐÐÐÂ°``ÂWe decline to 
adopt the rule urged bydefendants that the appropriate 
constructionis to disallow testimony from all who did, orcould 
have, testified before theadministrative hearing.  We believe 
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that,although an appropriate limit in many cases, arigid rule to 
this effect would unduly limit acourt's discretion and constrict 
its abilityto form the independent judgment Congressexpressly 
directed.  A salient effect ofdefendants' proposed rule would be 
to limitexpert testimony to the administrativehearing.  Our 
review of the cases involvingthe Act reveals that in many 
instances thedistrict court found expert testimony helpfulin 
illuminating the nature of the controversyand relied on it in its 
decisional process. Å°ÅThere could be some valid reasons for 
notpresenting some or all expert testimony beforethe state 
agency.ÐÐÆx`ÆÐÐÃÃId.ÄÄ at 790©91.Å°ÅÁ``ÁThus, the ÃÃBurlingtonÄÄ 
court stated that certain evidencemay be excluded under IDEA 
judicial review out of deference tothe administrative 
proceedings.  The court, however, declined todevise a bright©line 
rule, choosing instead to leave "thequestion of the weight due 
the administrative findings of fact"to the discretion of the 
trial court.  ÃÃId.ÄÄ at 791©92.  Othercourts, including ours, 
likewise have condoned the exclusion ofadditional evidence 
submitted by the parties to an IDEAproceeding when, for a 
particular reason, the court properlycould exclude the evidence.  
ÃÃSee, e.g.ÄÄ, ÃÃBernardsvilleÄÄ, 42 F.3d at161 (upholding 
exclusion of evidence as cumulative and improperembellishment of 
testimony previously given at administrativehearing).Á``ÁIt is 
regularly held that the question of whatadditional evidence to 
admit in an IDEA judicial reviewÔØ'0* ( (°°Ôproceeding, as well 
as the question of the weight due theadministrative findings of 
fact, should be left to the discretionof the trial court.  ÃÃSee, 
16 
e.g.ÄÄ, ÃÃCarlisleÄÄ, 62 F.3d at 527;ÃÃBernardsvilleÄÄ, 42 F.3d 
at 161; ÃÃObertiÄÄ, 995 F.2d at 1219;ÃÃBurlingtonÄÄ, 736 F.2d at 
791©92.  As appellants note, Congress'central goal in enacting 
the IDEA was to ensure "that each childwith disabilities has 
access to a program that is tailored to hisor her changing needs 
and designed to achieve educationalprogress."  Appellants' br. at 
11.  Children are not staticbeings; neither their academic 
progress nor their disabilitieswait for the resolution of legal 
conflicts.  While a districtcourt appropriately may exclude 
additional evidence, a court mustexercise particularized 
discretion in its rulings so that it willconsider evidence 
relevant, non©cumulative and useful indetermining whether 
Congress' goal has been reached for the childinvolved.  
Consequently, on the remand the district court shoulduse this 
standard in determining whether to admit the proferredadditional 
evidence, ÃÃi.e.ÄÄ, would the evidence assist the court 
inascertaining whether Congress' goal has been and is being 
reachedÔ‰?°Ôfor the child involved.Ö›x°$=Because we vacate the 
judgment of the district court andremand the case for the 
district court's evaluation of additionalevidence, which may lead 
to the admission of some, none, or allof the evidence submitted, 
it is not necessary for us to addressappellants' claim that the 
district court denied them a fairopportunity to argue their case.  
The remand necessarily resolvesthat issue. ›ÖÁàèìÁD.  ÃÃFUHRMANN 
V. EAST HANOVER BOARD OF EDUCATIONÄÄƒÔ@0* ( (°°ÔŒÁ``ÁWe consider 
one final matter with respect to the"additional evidence" clause 
of the IDEA.  In deciding to rule onthe merits of appellants' 
17 
IDEA claims without evaluating oraccepting their offer of 
additional evidence, the district courtrelied on our holding in 
ÃÃFuhrmannÄÄ, 993 F.2d 1031, in addition torelying on the Supreme 
Court's decision in ÃÃRowleyÄÄ.  ÃÃSeeÄÄ Mem. at11©12.  The 
district court cited ÃÃFuhrmannÄÄ for the propositionthat "the 
court cannot assess the adequacy of a student'splacement `at some 
later date when one has the benefit of thechild's actual 
experience,'" Mem. at 11 (quoting ÃÃFuhrmannÄÄ, 993F.2d at 1040), 
but instead "must measure the adequacy of aneducational program 
at the time it was offered to the student." Mem. at 12 (citing 
ÃÃFuhrmannÄÄ, 993 F.2d at 1040).  As theappellants "proposed that 
they be allowed to supplement therecord with additional evidence 
which was not available in 1992,"the district court chose to 
address the merits of their casewithout evaluating or admitting 
that evidence because in the eyesof the district court, doing so 
would be "second©guess[ing] thejudgment of the administrative 
panel with evidence that was notbefore the panel when it made its 
decision."  Mem. at 12.  Thecourt proceeded to "confine its 
analysis to the evidence that wasbefore the panel in 1992, and . 
. . give due deference to the[administrative] panel's findings."  
ÃÃId.ÄÄ  In order to addressÔ`"0* ( (°°Ôcompletely appellants' 
claim for relief, we must revisit theÔ‰?Ôevidentiary issues we 
considered in ÃÃFurhmannÄÄ.ÖE$=Appellants try to minimize the 
applicability of ÃÃFuhrmannÄÄ tothis case by pointing out that 
the major thrust of their claim is"for a prospective 
determination of eligibility for services," appellants' br. at 
20.  They continue:ÐÐÂ°``ÂIt may well be unfair to force a 
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district topay reimbursement where it correctlyidentified the 
child as eligible and developedan IEP reasonably calculated to 
produceprogress, even if, in hindsight, progress didnot actually 
occur.  But there is nothingunfair about parents trying to 
convince acourt that their child should be declared ©©at least 
from that point forward ©© to have adisability, and nothing 
irrelevant aboutevidence that brings the court up to date 
onwhether indicia of a disability are present.Æx`ÆÐÐAppellants' 
br. at 20©21.  Although appellants try to convince usthat we need 
not address ÃÃFuhrmannÄÄ's effect on their claims, ÃÃseeÄÄbr. at 
21 n.10 ("[T]he Court need not decide these points."),appellants, 
as they admit, did include claims for reimbursementin their 
complaint in the district court. Br. at 20 n.9.  Thus,we must 
address ÃÃFuhrmannÄÄ's holding to see if what appellants seekis 
truly the "unfair" use of hindsight in judging the 
schooldistrict's decision regarding M.'s eligibility for 
specialeducation.EÖÁ``ÁIn ÃÃFuhrmannÄÄ, we addressed the claim of 
parents of achild with disabilities for reimbursement for two 
years ofprivate schooling for their son.  The parents contended 
that theindividual education programs that the school district 
hadoffered to the child were inappropriate and thus violated 
theÔ‰?ðÔIDEA.ÖÈx0ð¨$=Appellants again try to distinguish their 
case from ÃÃFuhrmannÄÄ by pointing out that "[u]nlike the 
[appellants] here,the parents in ÃÃFuhrmannÄÄ were not seeking a 
determination ofeligibility for special education, or a finding 
concerning theprogram that would be appropriate for their child 
in the future." Appellants' br. at 19.  We decline, however, to 
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draw such aÔØ'0* ( (°°Ôbright line between the appropriateness of 
taking additionalevidence in an IDEA judicial review proceeding 
when thereasonableness of an IEP is at issue and taking such 
evidence ina proceeding where the initial determination of 
eligibility forspecial education is being litigated.  However, we 
do note thatCongress' primary purpose in enacting the IDEA did 
seem to be theassurance of access to special education services 
for childrenwith disabilities.  ÃÃSeeÄÄ 20 U.S.C. ÀÀ 1400(c) ("It 
is the purposeof this chapter to assure that all children with 
disabilitieshave available to them . . . a free appropriate 
public educationwhich emphasizes special education and related 
services designedto meet their unique needs[.]").  But we also 
note that in ÃÃW.B.v. MatulaÄÄ, No. 95©5033, we recently held 
that the IDEA allows therecovery of damages as rather broadly 
defined.  Slip op. at 16ª17.  Obviously, a court would have to 
exercise great care inadmitting after©acquired evidence in a 
damages action,particularly one such as this case, which involves 
a claim forpunitive damages.  Thus, while we are not drawing 
bright lines,we do observe that a more liberal approach might be 
appropriatein a case involving a claim for remedial educational 
relief ascontrasted to a damages action.ÈÖ  Neither party sought 
to introduce additional evidence inÔðÀ0* ( (°°ÔÃÃFuhrmannÄÄ.  993 
F.2d at 1034 n.3.  The issue, instead, was theweight that the 
district court should give to evidence already inthe 
administrative record regarding the child's progress inprivate 
school (evidence amassed after the school district'sdecision 
regarding the IEP but before the parents sought judicialreview).  
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ÃÃId.ÄÄ at 1039.  As appellants note, we held in ÃÃFuhrmannÄÄthat 
the district's liability hinged upon whether its proposedprogram 
for the child was, at the time it was offered,"reasonably 
calculated" to benefit the child.  Appellants br. at19.  
Appellants interpret our ruling as follows:ÐÐÐÐÂ°``ÂThe Court 
declined, therefore, to adopt a ruleunder which the district 
would have beenfinancially penalized for an IEP that, 
whileapparently appropriate at the time it wasdeveloped, turned 
out in hindsight to beinadequate.  Accordingly, the Court 
held,evidence of the child's subsequent educationalprogress (or 
lack thereof) could be consideredÔÀ0* ( (°°Ôonly insofar as it 
bore on the issue ofwhether the IEP was appropriate when it 
wascreated.ÐÐÆx`ÆÐÐAppellants' br. at 20 (citing ÃÃFuhrmannÄÄ, 
993 F.2d at 1040).Á``ÁAppellants' characterization of our holding 
in ÃÃFuhrmannÄÄis fair.  The case was unusual in that the panel 
authored threeseparate opinions: one opinion by Judge Garth for 
the court, oneconcurring opinion by Judge Mansmann, and one 
concurring anddissenting opinion by Judge Hutchinson.  On the 
matter of whatweight to give evidence not before a school 
district when itoriginally made the decision regarding the 
educational placementof a child, Judge Garth and Judge Mansmann 
agreed on theaforementioned holding: "[T]he measure and adequacy 
of an IEP canonly be determined as of the time it is offered to 
the student,and not at some later date."  993 F.2d at 1040.  
However, despiteJudge Garth's statement that "Judge Mansmann and 
I are incomplete agreement as to the time when we must look at 
the`reasonable calculation' made pursuant to ÃÃRowleyÄÄ," 
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ÃÃid.ÄÄ, the twojudges may have come to different conclusions as 
to theconsequences of that holding.  While Judge Garth stated 
that"evidence of a student's later educational progress may only 
beconsidered in determining ÃÃwhether the original IEP was 
reasonablycalculated to afford some educational benefitÄÄ," 
ÃÃid.ÄÄ (emphasisadded), Judge Mansmann concluded that "evidence 
of what tookplace after the hearing officer rendered his decision 
in the fallof 1989 is not relevant in deciding whether [the 
child's] 1989©90placement was appropriate."  ÃÃId.ÄÄ at 1041 
(Mansmann, J.,Ô'0* ( (°°Ôconcurring).  Judge Garth thus seemed to 
take the lessrestrictive approach, one that would admit evidence 
dating from atime after both the school district and the hearing 
officer madetheir decisions, but only in determining the 
reasonableness ofthe school district's original decision.  Judge 
Mansmann'sopinion could be read to indicate that she would not 
admit suchevidence at all, and the school district advances that 
reading. ÃÃSeeÄÄ appellee's br. at 10 n.3.Á``ÁIn light of the 
IDEA's purpose "to assure that allchildren with disabilities have 
available to them . . . a freeappropriate public education which 
emphasizes special educationand related services," 20 U.S.C. ÀÀ 
1400(c), in addition to itsdirective to "hear additional evidence 
at the request of aparty," ÃÃid.ÄÄ ÀÀ 1415(e)(2), we believe that 
Judge Garth'sinterpretation of the statute should control the 
taking ofevidence on judicial review that was not before the 
schooldistrict when it made its initial IDEA placement decisions.  
Inso concluding, however, we stress that such 
after©acquiredevidence, such as information received through the 
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experience ofan alternative placement, should be used by courts 
only inassessing the reasonableness of the district's initial 
decisionsregarding a particular IEP or the provision of special 
educationservices at all.  Courts must be vigilant to heed Judge 
Garth'swarning that "[n]either the statute nor reason 
countenance`Monday Morning Quarterbacking' in evaluating the 
appropriatenessof a child's placement."   993 F.2d at 1040.  
Ô'0* ( (°°ÔŒÁ``ÁThe dangers inherent in this process of 
second©guessingthe decisions of a school district with 
information to which itcould not possibly have had access at the 
time it made thosedecisions are great.  As appellants recognize, 
it indeed would beunfair "to adopt a rule under which [a] 
district would [be]financially penalized for an IEP that, while 
apparentlyappropriate at the time it was developed, turned out in 
hindsightto be inadequate."  Appellants' br. at 20.  Our recent 
holding inÃÃCarlisleÄÄ, 62 F.2d at 534, is not inconsistent with 
theseconclusions, for in that case we merely emphasized 
theprospective nature of judging the appropriateness of a 
particularIEP, and cited ÃÃFuhrmannÄÄ for the prospect that a 
student'ssubsequent failure to make progress in school does 
notretrospectively render an IEP ÃÃperÄÄ ÃÃseÄÄ inappropriate.  
In ÃÃCarlisleÄÄ,we did not address specifically the issue of how 
to use afterªacquired evidence in assessing the reasonableness of 
an IEP ©© ajudicial process that, by the very nature of judicial 
review,must occur after the formulation of the educational 
program.Á``ÁIn remanding this case to the district court, then, 
wehold that it was not within that court's discretion to 
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rejectappellants' offer of additional evidence without even 
evaluatingit for its admissibility.  However, we also note that, 
because atleast some of appellants' proffered additional evidence 
wasacquired after the school district's decision regarding M.'s 
needfor special education, the district court will need to 
examinesuch evidence carefully.  Such evidence may be considered 
onlyÔ'0* ( (°°Ôwith respect to the ÃÃreasonablenessÄÄ of the 
district's decision atthe time it was made.  Of course, this 
caveat does not mean thatthe court cannot exclude evidence that 
could have been availablewhen the school district made its 
decision.Áà@ìÁE.  THE PREEMPTIVE EFFECT OF THE IDEAƒÁ``ÁFinally, 
appellants contend that the district courterroneously dismissed 
their additional statutory claims as"preempted" by the IDEA.  We 
agree.Á``ÁSection 1415(f) of the IDEA 
states:ÐÐÐÐÐÐÂ°``ÂÁ¸¸ÁNothing in this chapter shall beconstrued 
to restrict or limit the rights,procedures, and remedies 
available under theConstitution, title V of the RehabilitationAct 
of 1973 [29 U.S.C. ÀÀ 790 et seq.], orother Federal statutes 
protecting the rightsof children and youth with 
disabilities,except that before the filing of a civilaction under 
such laws seeking relief that isalso available under this 
subchapter, theprocedures under subsections (b)(2) and (c) ofthis 
section shall be exhausted to the sameextent as would be required 
had the actionbeen brought under this subchapter.ÐÐÆx`ÆÐÐ20 
U.S.C. ÀÀ 1415(f).  In its Memorandum Opinion, the districtcourt 
interpreted this section of the IDEA to mean that "parentsmust 
first challenge [an] educational program under the IDEAbefore 
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they may pursue a civil action alleging additional causesof 
action."  Mem. at 10©11.  The court thereafter concluded thatthe 
appellants' additional statutory claims were "clearly preªempted 
by ÀÀ 1415(f)" and therefore should be dismissed.  ÃÃId.ÄÄ 
at11.Á``ÁThe district court's dismissal of appellants'additional 
statutory claims was a legal determination over 
whichÔØ'0* ( (°°Ôwe exercise plenary review.  ÃÃCarlisleÄÄ, 62 
F.3d at 526; ÃÃFuhrmannÄÄ,993 F.2d at 1033.  While section 
1415(f) requires a party toexhaust the IDEA's administrative 
remedies before pursuing otherclaims, the section makes clear 
that the IDEA is not theexclusive avenue through which children 
with disabilities canassert claims for an appropriate education.  
ÃÃW.B. v. MatulaÄÄ, slipÔ‰?`Ôop. at 14©15;ÃÃÄÄ ÃÃHayes v. Unified 
Sch. Dist.ÄÄ, 877 F.2d 809, 812(10th Cir. 1989); ÃÃBoard of Educ. 
v. DiamondÄÄ, 808 F.2d 987, 995(3d Cir. 1986).Á``ÁIndeed, 
Congress amended the IDEA in 1986 to includesection 1415(f) in 
response to the Supreme Court's decision inÃÃSmith v. RobinsonÄÄ, 
468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457 (1984), whichheld that the IDEA was 
the exclusive statute through which adisabled child could obtain 
relief.  ÃÃSeeÄÄ The HandicappedChildren's Protection Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99©372 ÀÀ 3, 100Stat. 796, 797 (1986).  Section 
1415(f) thus clarified Congress'intent with regard to the 
preemptive effect of the IDEA. ÃÃDiamondÄÄ, 808 F.2d at 995.  As 
we recently stated, "Section1415(f) was . . . enacted to 
`reaffirm, in light of [ÃÃSmithÄÄ], theviability of section 504, 
42 U.S.C. ÀÀ 1983, and other statutes asseparate vehicles for 
ensuring the rights of handicappedchildren.'"  ÃÃMatulaÄÄ, slip 
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op. at 14©15 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99ª296, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 
4 (1985)); ÃÃsee alsoÄÄ ÃÃMrs. W. v.TirozziÄÄ, 832 F.2d 748, 
754©55 (2d Cir. 1987).Á``ÁThus, the district court erred in 
dismissing theappellants' additional statutory claims as 
preempted by the IDEA. Ô'0* ( (°°ÔWhile the school district 
states that "the lower court appears tohave overlooked Section 
1415(f) of the IDEA" in so ruling,appellee's Br. at 18, it claims 
that "the record simply does notsupport the maintenance of a 
cause of action against appellees onany other theory."  ÃÃId.ÄÄ  
But even though this assertion may beestablished on remand, it 
was not within the district court'sdiscretion to dismiss the 
appellants' claims without addressingtheir merits.  Accordingly, 
we will vacate the order of thedistrict court dismissing 
appellants' additional statutoryÔ‰?Ôclaims.ÃÃÄÄÃÃÔ‰?0ÔÁàhì#ÁIII. 
CONCLUSIONÄÄƒÁ``ÁFor all the reasons detailed above, we will 
vacate thedistrict court's order entered September 27, 1994.  We 
willremand the case to the district court for the evaluation 
and,perhaps, depending on that evaluation, the taking of 
additionalevidence on the IDEA claim and for further proceedings 
consistentwith this opinion.  Costs shall be allowed the 
appellants. 
